In her chapter four case study of
Jakarta, Bakkar describes the elite of Jakarta fleeing to walled-off,
modernized zones: gated communities connected by private toll roads to private
malls and government complexes. Bakkar calls this a “variant of the colonial
strategy of indirect rule,” quoting Chatterjee, as, because the elite have
access to infrastructure, projects of modernization stagnate. She writes, “the
project of modernization, which is, in part, a process of converting subaltern
subjects into citizens (and mutually transforming these groups in the process),
comes to a halt; or, more accurately, is transfigured as a dual process of
inclusion and exclusion” (131).
The mention of colonial indirect
rule turned my mind back to both Mrázek’s Engineers
of Happy Land and Larkin’s Signal and
Noise. Larkin describes indirect rule as a “double state” (22). In Larkin’s
terms, this double state referred to dual layers of authority, the colonial
system layered over emirate authority. Larkin connects infrastructure projects
to legitimizing colonial rule, and quotes Mrázek , saying infrastructure
projects create “sensing of colonial modernity.” Larkin calls this the “colonial
sublime.” Describing two views of colonial indirect rule in Nigeria, Larkin
writes, “Southern colonialists saw indirect rule as an abnegation of colonial
responsibility, a means of propagating the backwardness of what amounted to a
feudal elite. Northern colonialists raised it to an article of faith, seeing
the Islamic subjects of the North as socially superior to the Southern
Nigerians” (27), that indirect rule enabled Northern Nigerians to maintain a
special identity.
In contrast, Bakkar’s indirect rule
is rule of the elites over the disenfranchised, those who are not considered
citizens by virtue of disconnection. As part of her argument that the
public/private debate over water infrastructure is much more complicated and
nuanced than ideologues allow, she describes how, in Indonesia, public and
private efforts at building and maintaining water infrastructure had similarly
negative results. In the case of Jakarta, Bakkar argues, states and market
efforts both failed, resulting in what she calls urban fragmentation. Both
governments and private companies in Jakarta seemed to deliberately work to
exclude the poor, or they were incapable of following through. These failures inscribed
themselves upon the city, distinguishing by access to water infrastructure who
is considered a citizen in Indonesia.
Bakkar also pointed out that
households in Jakarta work to find solutions to their lack of access, solutions
that often cannot be described as either private or public. I was so interested
b the examples Bakkar provided at the beginning of chapter one, presumably about
Indonesians, that I searched for some information on more current local efforts
to deal with water problems. Interestingly, I found this article from UNESCO,
which reports on the annual Indonesia-Nederland Society Seminar’s panel on
water, and this article from the World Bank. These articles indicate the
continued presence of multinational private corporation interest in water infrastructure
in Indonesia, as well as the involvement of governments, NGOs, and the continuing
heritage of colonialism in Indonesian infrastructure, even to the extent that
Dutch plans in Rotterdam were presented as viable options for Indonesian water
systems.
Interesting contrast with Larkin made here to identify those disenfranchised 'populations' with tenuous rights that constitute, in Chatterjee's terms, a "political society." The Rotterdam plan as a model for hydraulic infrastructure in contemporary Indonesia brings a whole new meaning to privatization as neocolonialism -- also shown in the film, Thirst.
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